We propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation, providing strong security guarantees for components written in unsafe, low-level languages with C-style undefined behavior. Our criterion goes beyond recent proposals, which protect the trace properties of a single component against an adversarial context, to model dynamic compromise in a system of mutually distrustful components. Each component is protected from all the others until it receives an input that triggers an undefined behavior, causing it to become compromised and attack the remaining uncompromised components. To illustrate this model, we demonstrate a secure compilation chain for an unsafe language with buffers, procedures, and components, compiled to a simple RISC abstract machine with built-in compartmentalization. The protection guarantees offered by this abstract machine can be achieved at the machine-code level using either software fault isolation or tag-based reference monitoring. We are working on machine-checked proofs showing that this compiler satisfies our secure compilation criterion.
Extended Abstract
Computer systems are distressingly insecure. Visiting a website, opening an email, or serving a client request often suffice to open the door to control-hijacking attacks. These devastating low-level attacks typically exploit memory-safety vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows, use-after-frees, or double frees, which are abundant in large software systems.
Various techniques have been proposed for guaranteeing memory safety [1, 8] , but the challenges of efficiency, precision, scalability, backwards compatibility, and effective deployment have hampered their widespread adoption. Meanwhile, new mitigation techniques aim at dealing with the most onerous consequences of memory unsafeness. In particular, compartmentalization offers a strong, practical defense against low-level attacks exploiting memory unsafeness [2, 4, 12] . At least three compartmentalization technologies are widely deployed: process-level privilege separation [2, 4, 6] (used, e.g., in OpenSSH [9] and for sandboxing plugins and tabs in modern web browsers [10] ), software fault isolation [11] (provided, e.g., by Google Native Client [13] ), and hardware enclaves (e.g., Intel SGX); many more are on the drawing boards [1, 12] .
Such low-level compartmentalization mechanisms are well suited for building more secure compiler chains. In particular, they can be exposed in unsafe low-level languages like C and be targeted by their compiler chains to enable efficiently breaking up large applications into mutually distrustful components that run with minimal privileges and can interact only via well-defined interfaces. Intuitively, protecting each component from all the others should have strong security benefits: the compromise of some components should not compromise the security of the whole application.
What, exactly, are the formal security guarantees one can obtain from such secure compiler chains? To answer this question, we start from robust compilation [3] , a recently proposed formal criterion for secure compilation, which implies the preservation of all trace properties even against adversarial contexts. These traces are normally built over events such as inputs from and outputs to the environment [7] . We write P ⇓ t to mean that the complete program P can produce trace t with respect to some operational semantics. Armed with this, robust compilation is formally stated as:
For any partial source program P and any (adversarial) target context C T where C T linked with the compiled variant of P can produce a (bad) trace t in the target language (written C T [P↓] ⇓ t), we can construct a(n adversarial) sourcelevel context C S that can produce trace t in the source language when linked with P (C S [P] ⇓ t). Intuitively, any attack trace t that context C T can mount against P ↓ can already be mounted against P by some source language context C S . Conversely, any trace property that holds of P when linked with any arbitrary source context will still hold for P↓ when linked with an arbitrary target context.
In this work, we propose a new formal criterion for secure compilation that extends robust compilation to protecting mutually distrustful components against each other in an unsafe low-level language with C-style undefined behavior. The characterization of robust compilation above does not directly apply in this setting, since it assumes the source language is safe and P cannot have undefined behavior. The simplest way to adapt robust compilation to an unsafe source language is the following:
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Instead of requiring that C S [P] perform the entire trace t, we also allow it to produce a finite prefix t ′ that ends with an undefined behavior in P (which we write as t ′ ≼ P t). Intuitively, since we want to reason only in terms of safe source contexts we do not allow C S to exhibit undefined behaviors. However, even a safe context can sometimes trigger an undefined behavior in the protected program P, in which case there is no way to keep protecting P going forward. However, P is fully protected until it receives an input that causes undefined behavior. This is a good step towards a model of dynamic compromise.
The next step is to support mutual distrustful components in such a dynamic compromise model. We start by taking both partial programs and contexts to be sets of components and plugging a program in a context to be linking. We compile sets of components by separately compiling each component. We start with all components being uncompromised and incrementally replace any component that exhibits undefined behavior in the source with an arbitrary safe component that will now attack the remaining uncompromised components. However, the definition above is not strong enough to give us security in this setting, since it only requires the safe component C S that we use to replace C T (the first compiled component to have undefined behavior) to produce a prefix of the original trace t that triggers an undefined behavior in a honest component. After we replace C T with C S , we want C S to continue playing the game, replacing compromised components one by one until we can produce the whole trace t in the source language. But the source language cannot model these intermediate steps, in which honest components exhibit undefined behavior.
To get around this, we have devised a new formal definition of secure compilation for unsafe low-level components:
Instead of trying to characterize the interaction of C S and P in the source language, we do it in the target, requiring the compiled and linked "C S ↓[P ↓]" to produce the whole trace t. In addition, we require the context C S to be "fully defined" [5] , which means it cannot cause undefined behavior when linked with any source program. Together with whole-program compiler correctness (à la CompCert [7] ),
this new secure compilation definition implies the first one above, allowing us to still reason in terms of the source language when needed. More importantly, the new definition allows us to play an iterative game in which each component is protected until it receives an input that triggers an undefined behavior, causing it to become compromised and to attack the remaining uncompromised components. This is the first security definition in this space to support both dynamic compromise and mutual distrust, whose interaction is subtle and has eluded previous attempts at characterizing the security guarantees of compartmentalizing compilation as extensions of fully abstract compilation [5] .
We illustrate this new security definition by applying it to a new secure compilation chain for an unsafe language with buffers, procedures, components, and a CompCert-inspired memory model. We compile this language to a simple RISC abstract machine with built-in compartmentalization and are working on constructing machine-checked Coq proofs that this compiler satisfies our secure compilation definition. In terms of proof effort, we reduce (a safety-variant of) our property to providing a back-translation of individual finite trace prefixes to safe high-level contexts together with three standard simulation proofs, while previous proofs in this space were much more complex and non-standard [5] . This gives us hope that our security definition and proof technique can be scaled to something as large as a secure variant of CompCert.
Finally, we show that the protection of the compartmentalized abstract machine can be achieved at the lowest machinecode level using either software-fault isolation [11] or tagbased reference monitoring [1] . We have built two such back ends for our compiler and used property-based testing to validate that the two are functional and secure.
